The Political Economy of Land Governance in Viet Nam by Hirsch, Philip et al.
HAL Id: halshs-02372282
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02372282
Submitted on 20 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
The Political Economy of Land Governance in Viet Nam
Philip Hirsch, Marie Mellac, Natalia Scurrah
To cite this version:
Philip Hirsch, Marie Mellac, Natalia Scurrah. The Political Economy of Land Governance in Viet
Nam. [Research Report] Mekong Region Land Governance. 2015, 19 p. ￿halshs-02372282￿
The Political Economy  
of Land Governance  
in Viet Nam
Philip Hirsch, Marie Mellac and Natalia Scurrah
November 2015
Research by:With support from:
The Political Economy  
of Land Governance  
in Vietnam
Philip Hirsch1, Marie Mellac2 and Natalia Scurrah1
1  University of Sydney
2  University of Bordeaux
November 2015
Front cover photo: Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation SDC
i ité Bordeaux Montaigne 
III
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF LAND GOVERNANCE 2
HISTORY AND KEY TRANSITIONS IN LAND RELATIONS 2
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT OF LAND USE AND LAND RELATIONS 4
STRUCTURES OF POWER AND PATRONAGE IN LAND RELATIONS 4
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN LAND 5
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAND RELATIONS 7
ACTOR DYNAMICS IN DECISION MAKING AND CONTESTATION AROUND LAND 7
AGRICULTURAL MODERNISATION 8
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, LAND GRABBING AND DISPOSSESSION 8
FORMALISATION, TITLING AND TENURE SECURITY 9
LAND CONCENTRATION, LANDLESSNESS AND DISTRIBUTION 10
CONSTRAINTS AND OPENINGS IN LAND GOVERNANCE 11
LAND AND RELATED POLICY AND LAW REFORM 11
POSITIONS, AGENDAS AND INTERESTS BEHIND LAND GOVERNANCE REFORM 11
CONCLUSION 15
REFERENCES 16
IV
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB Asian Development Bank
ASCP Advocacy Coalition Support Programme
CLMV Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam
CPLAR Cooperation Programme on Land Administration Reform
DFID Department for International Development
LandNet Forest Peoples Land Rights Network
MONRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
NGO Non-Government Organisation
SEMLA Strengthening Environmental Management and Land Administration
SFC State Forest Companies
UK United Kingdom
UNDP United Nations Development Program
US United States
WB World Bank
1Political Economy of Land Governance in Viet Nam
Land governance is an inherently political-economic 
issue. This report on Viet Nam is one of a series of 
country reports on Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet 
Nam (CLMV) that seek to present country-level analyses 
of the political economy of land governance.
The country level analysis addresses land governance 
in Viet Nam in two ways. First, it summarises what the 
existing body of knowledge tells us about power and 
configurations that shape access to and exclusion from 
land, particularly among smallholders, the rural poor, 
ethnic minorities and women. Second, it draws upon 
existing literature and expert assessment to provide a 
preliminary analysis of the openings for and obstacles 
to land governance reform afforded by the political 
economic structures and dynamics of each country.
The premise of this analysis is that existing config-
urations of social, political, administrative and economic 
power lead to unequal distribution of land and related 
resources. They also produce outcomes that are socially 
exclusionary, environmentally unsustainable and 
economically inefficient. Power imbalances at various 
levels of society result in growing insecurity of land 
tenure, loss of access to resources by smallholders, 
increasing food and livelihood insecurity, and human 
rights abuses. The first part of this analysis explains why, 
how and with what results for different groups these 
exclusionary arrangements and outcomes are occurring.
In recognition of the problems associated with existing 
land governance arrangements, a number of reform 
initiatives are underway in the Mekong Region. Most of 
these initiatives seek to enhance security of access to 
land by disadvantaged groups. All the initiatives work 
within existing structures of power, and the second part 
of the analysis discusses the potential opportunities and 
constraints afforded by the existing arrangements.
This country report commences with a brief identi-
fication of the political-economic context that sets the 
parameters for existing land governance and for reform 
in Viet Nam. It then explores the political-economic 
dynamics of land relations and identifies key transitions 
in land relations that affect access to land and tenure 
security for smallholders.  Finally, the report discusses 
key openings for, and constraints to, land governance 
reform.
Viet Nam has been characterised by smallholder 
agriculture with relatively little private concentration of 
land; however, there is a new trend of growing inequality 
in access to land.  Unlike Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar 
(the other countries examined in this series), Viet Nam 
has seen limited development of large-scale private 
plantation agriculture in recent years. The loss of land 
by smallholders has occurred in different parts of the 
country in different ways and by a range of processes 
closely linked to the country’s rapid development toward 
a more industrialised, urbanised market economy. In 
the Mekong Delta, landlessness is associated with debt, 
historical patterns of landlordism, and rural to urban 
migration. In the Red River Delta and many other areas 
including medium sized urban centres, land conversion 
to non-agricultural uses is a significant issue (Van Suu 
2009; Phuc et al. 2014).  In the highlands, displacement 
of ethnic minorities has taken a number of forms, from 
migration of lowlanders to the use of land by state farms. 
 Meanwhile, rapid coastal development, establishment 
of industrial estates and hydroelectric projects have 
displaced significant numbers of smallholders from their 
land.
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HISTORY AND KEY TRANSITIONS IN LAND 
RELATIONS
In contrast to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, Viet Nam 
has historically been faced with scarcity of land. Land 
has played an important part in the country’s political 
evolution and transitions since pre-colonial times. Long 
before the French arrived, the Red River Delta faced very 
high agricultural population density, placing land at the 
centre of relationships between farmers and those in 
authority, and also shaping social relations at the village 
level. Viet Nam’s social structure was based on unequal 
land relations in which bureaucrats and landlords had 
a significant land management role (Kleinen 2011: 457). 
However, there were also safeguards for the rural poor 
in the form of access to marginal communally allocated 
alluvial lands (ibid). At a broader level, the “march to the 
south” (Nam Tien) marked the history of Viet Nam’s pre-
colonial expansion for several hundred years. Patterns 
of land settlement and landholding in the Mekong Delta 
continue to have vestiges of the quasi-military early 
agricultural settlements (Brocheux 1995). Sikor links 
these to experimental colonial settlement schemes, 
US hamlets as strategic resettlement and later the 
Communist state’s New Economic Zones to settle the 
highlands for both strategic and agricultural purposes 
(Sikor et al. 2012: 2).
The colonial period in Viet Nam saw a strengthening of 
the bureaucratic land management and growing land 
inequality in the Red River and Mekong Deltas (Kleinen 
2011). At the same time, in northern Viet Nam up to 20 
per cent of agricultural land was kept under communal 
management at the village level to provide a safety 
valve for the rural landless or near-landless. During the 
colonial period, large areas of communal land found its 
way into the hands of French colonists or local landlord 
elites (Kleinen 2011; Van Suu 2007: 311). In the midlands 
and highlands, large tracts were alienated to French 
planters for cultivation of rubber and coffee. Do & Iyer 
(2008: 534) maintain that more than half (52 per cent) 
of the agricultural land in Viet Nam was owned by three 
per cent of the population by the 1940s, and rates of 
landlessness reached 60 per cent, although the sources 
of these dramatic figures on land inequality are not 
given. These figures are exaggerated by the existence 
of large plantations. The level of concentration in rice 
growing areas was considerably less but still significant. 
Unsurprisingly, peasant unrest during the latter part of 
the colonial period played an important part in the anti-
colonial independence movement, although “patriotic” 
landlords were kept onside by the Viet Minh.
Following the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 
1954, there was an immediate and rapid re-allocation 
of land away from landlords to landless or land-short 
peasants in the communist land reform of northern Viet 
Nam. However, violent excesses, particularly against 
village elites, led to the abrupt cessation of the reform 
in 1956, following which collectivization was pro-
gressively launched (Van Suu 2007: 311). This involved 
a rapid transfer of land from farm households to 
cooperatives. By the late 1960s collectivization was 90 
per cent complete, albeit in a country at the brink of 
war. The South took a different path, supported by the 
United States. Increasing recognition of the agrarian 
base of support for the Viet Cong led the southern 
regime to institute its own land reform with reallocation 
of land away from larger landholders. However, it was 
mainly the middle rather than poorer peasants who 
benefited from Nguyen Van Thieu’s land reforms (Van 
Suu 2007: 312). Poorer peasants in the Mekong Delta 
were allocated land by the National Liberation Front 
in liberated areas, helping to garner support for the 
Communist armed struggle. Meanwhile, in the North 
during the post-independence period, large numbers of 
lowland farmers were sent to clear land for farming in 
the north-western highlands.
Following the end of the war in 1975 and reunification 
in 1976, collectivisation was intensified in the north and 
extended across the whole country, with disastrous 
results in both cases. The experiment was abandoned 
after just a few years in most places, and legislation 
tended to follow practice with the establishment of the 
household responsibility system that saw progressive 
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country. Cooperatives retained residual functions in 
irrigation and plant protection.  
With the advent of the policy of Doi moi, or Renovation, 
after the sixth Party Congress in 1986, Viet Nam moved 
toward a “socialist-oriented market economy”. In 1988, 
Politburo Resolution No 10 provided for individual land 
holdings within cooperatives. This was in part in recog-
nition of the fact that, up to that time, production on the 
five per cent of land that was allowed to be worked as 
individual plots was producing up to 40 per cent of all 
food and other agricultural products. This commitment 
to smallholder based agriculture saw individual plots 
allocated on a longer and fixed term basis under the 
1993 land law, as “red books” (Land Use Rights 
Certificates). Red books were allocated to farmers for 
a 20 year period for annual crops and a 50 year period 
for perennials. Land remained under the nominal 
ownership of the people as a whole and management of 
the state, but exchange, transfer, lease, inheritance and 
mortgaging were all now allowed, moving the status of 
“red book” land closer to secure land title. From 1993 
to 2006, about 80 per cent of all agricultural land plots 
were allocated to households (Tran Nhu Trung et al. 
2006). Under the 2013 revised land law, the terms of the 
allocation were extended to 50 years for annual cropland 
and the principle of automatic reallocation to individuals 
was definitively recognised if land is used according to 
regulations.
Another important development in land relations after 
1976 was the establishment of New Economic Zones in 
the Central Highlands and other mountainous areas. 
About six million mainly farmers moved to these areas 
during the following two decades, placing significant 
pressure on the lands and cultivation systems of the 
ethnic minorities who had historically dominated this 
area. Most of these were Kinh, but according to Fortunel 
(2008), the number of ethnic groups in the Central 
Highlands increased from seven to 50, suggesting 
significant in-migration from non-Kinh areas as well. 
Conflicts erupted into serious unrest during the early 
2000s, and while the government in Hanoi blamed this 
on religious issues, agrarian pressures associated with 
land conflicts were generally recognised to be the key 
issue.
The most recent development to impact on land relations 
in Viet Nam has been the heavy push to modernise and 
industrialise. This has resulted in widespread land 
conversion, particularly in heavily populated peri-urban 
areas, taking some of the country’s most fertile 
agricultural land out of production.
“THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT TO 
IMPACT ON LAND RELATIONS IN VIET 
NAM HAS BEEN THE HEAVY PUSH TO 
MODERNISE AND INDUSTRIALISE.”
[PHOTO CREDIT: SDC]
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GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT OF LAND USE AND 
LAND RELATIONS
As in the other Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nam 
(CLMV) group countries, the political economy of land 
relations in Viet Nam is partly marked by a sharp 
contrast between the uplands and lowlands – a feature 
remarked upon by the French geographer Pierre Gourou 
in the 1930s. The densely populated and intensively 
cultivated delta and coastal areas, contrast with the 
more extensive patterns of settlement and cultivation in 
the mountainous interior. The demographic makeup of 
the interior has, until recently, been dominated by ethnic 
minorities, while the deltas and coastal areas have 
been dominated by the ethnically dominant Kinh – with 
exceptions in the Khmer and Cham areas of southern 
and central Viet Nam.
There are also significant differences within each of 
these broad agro-ecological zones. The Mekong Delta 
has about half the population density of the Red River 
Delta and its frontier history has led to a much more 
scattered pattern of settlement and more individualised 
social structure than the historically more collectively 
oriented Red River Delta. The frontier aspect of the 
Mekong Delta has continued until very recently, with the 
clearance of extensive areas of mangroves for shrimp 
cultivation and swamplands for extended rice cultivation.
Meanwhile, the different political histories of the north-
western highlands, where the Viet Minh drew much of 
its support in defeating the French, and the Central 
Highlands, where many montagnards fought alongside 
the Americans during the 1960s and 1970s, means that 
the settlement of ethnic Kinh in the Central Highlands 
has a greater sense of internal colonisation. The agro-
ecology is also different. The Central Highlands have 
been cleared more recently for cash crops, notably 
coffee. The north-western highlands have also seen 
conversion of land to rubber cultivation and other cash 
crops, in many cases involving land appropriation from 
smallholders in favour of commercial investors. Coercive 
means have been used to get smallholders to contribute 
their land in return for shareholding in large rubber 
enterprises (Lamb et al. 2015; Dao 2015). State forest 
enterprises and state farms operate in both upland 
zones, and their occupation of large tracts of land, 
combined with low levels of land productivity, have led 
to calls for reallocation toward smallholders.
STRUCTURES OF POWER AND PATRONAGE 
IN LAND RELATIONS
The State is the manager of all land in Viet Nam, and to 
date there have not been large concessions to private 
landholders. Most large land and forest enterprises 
in Viet Nam’s uplands are run by state enterprises.  
However, these have become increasingly corporate in 
character as state subsidies are removed in a market 
based economy. They have thus taken on characteristics 
similar to private investors, having a significant impact 
on power and control over land, particularly in ethnic 
minority areas.
Land is a fundamental issue in Viet Nam and therefore 
the drafting and implementation of land legislation 
has input from the highest level. The Politburo has 
ultimate say in the direction of land policy. However, as 
noted by Kerkvliet and others, the Party has been quite 
pragmatic and responsive in the past to grassroots 
actions and concerns (Kerkvliet 2005).  From a Central 
government and Party perspective, social stability 
needs to be put alongside mainstream economic policy, 
and there are clear tensions between the two in the 
case of agricultural land conversion. Added to this mix 
are concerns over food security, corruption, and Party 
legitimacy, keeping land issues at the centre of policy 
concerns and public debate.
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State-society relations in Viet Nam are complex and 
have been the subject of much research and analysis. 
Much of the research problematises the notion that in 
Viet Nam’s single party state with Confucian tradition, 
central authority is paramount, and rather suggests 
a longstanding dialectic between everyday practice 
and bureaucratic rule (Kerkvliet 2001).  Viet Namese 
language and culture is imbued with terms and proverbs 
concerned with the relationship between distant 
authority and local peasants or villagers, often invoking 
ancient royal authority and conflating it with the current 
rule of the Party/State (for example the well-known 
“phap vua thua le lang: royal authority defers to the 
custom of the village”).  Conflicts occur in various ways 
and over various issues. Nguyen Van Suu provides a 
detailed and insightful analysis of the differences in 
ways farmers and state officials see land in the Red 
River Delta, based on conflicts in the areas of land use 
rights, land law violation, compensation and corruption 
(Van Suu 2007). Gillespie has written extensively on the 
need to recognise legal pluralism and what he terms 
a “syncretic blend of statutory law, state policies, and 
community norms and practices” with regard to land and 
land disputes in Viet Nam (Gillespie 2013: 104; see also 
Gillespie 1998 and 2011). 
Devolution of authority over land and related resources 
is a key issue in relations between central authority and 
local autonomy in land relations. Various forest land 
allocation programs have been carried out in north-
western Viet Nam and more recently in the Central 
Highlands. However, the ability of such programs to 
reach or otherwise benefit the poorest of the poor has 
been questioned. This is partly because of the new 
exclusions that formalisation and regularisation impose 
on local property relations (Sikor & Nguyen 2007), and 
partly because of the need to address issues beyond 
property rights (Phuc 2008).
Patrilocal residence traditions (where a newly married 
couple settles in the husband’s home or community), 
patrilineal inheritance practices, and the low percentage 
of red book documents that register women’s joint 
ownership of land, all mitigate against women’s 
empowerment within the rural household in Viet Nam. 
Compared with the other three CLMV countries, Viet 
Nam has the most patrimonial culture, including a 
tradition of patrilocal residence by newly married 
couples. Superimposed on this is a formal system of 
landholding that disadvantages women. One of the 
most immediate actions that can be taken to redress 
this inequality is to increase the proportion of red books 
that include women as joint landowners (Scott 2003; 
Bélanger & Li 2009). Gender based tensions within 
households are not only related directly to land policy, 
but also to new agricultural practices associated, for 
example, with new hybrid rice seed varieties in upland 
areas (Bonnin & Turner 2013). Negotiation within the 
Viet Namese rural household by women has been shown 
to be enhanced where land is held solely or jointly in 
women’s names (Menon et al. 2014).
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN LAND
Public and private land tenure in Viet Nam is less clearly 
demarcated than in many other countries. Under the 
2013 Constitution, land remains under the “ownership” 
of the people as a whole. Yet land legislation since 1993 
has vested not only use rights, but also rights of sale, 
inheritance and mortgaging of such rights in individuals 
to the point where they resemble private property in 
many important respects. Meanwhile, the State retains 
the role of managing land allocation, including rights of 
appropriation that go beyond what is normally assumed 
in market economies.
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One of the recurring themes in property relations in 
post-socialist states is the set of ambiguities and grey 
areas between public and private interests in land and 
other resources.  Culas et al (2010: 97) write of the 
“fuzziness” with respect to interaction between people 
and authorities in dealings over land in the Red River 
Delta. Phan Trung Hien explores public and private 
interests in land acquisition in terms of finding an appro- 
priate “balance” (Hien 2007).  Others write of unresolved 
contradictions and tensions in the transition from a 
socialist state that maintains ultimate rights in manage-
ment of land on behalf of “the people” as a whole, and 
a system of individualised land use rights which were 
promulgated under the 1993 Land Law. Individualised 
land use rights are increasingly being encroached on 
by larger private as well as public interests associated 
with the country’s modernisation and industrialisation 
(Hansen 2013). These contradictions continue to be 
reflected in different schools of thought within Viet 
Nam, and inform active debates on land as a simple 
marketable commodity, land as an individual asset, land 
as socialised property or land as a community resource 
(Kerkvliet 2006).
Corruption is one of the most fraught issues regarding 
land in Viet Nam (Wells-Dang 2013: 7).  Public officials 
are often in positions as gatekeepers that allow them 
to reap benefit from private investors who gain access 
to smallholders’ land at low rates of compensation. 
Corruption takes many forms, most of which involve 
use of public office for private gain (World Bank et al. 
2011; Culas et al. 2010; Van Suu 2007). Transparency is 
identified as a key requirement to reduce the potential 
for abuse of power by corrupt officials and for efficient 
working of the land market and land administration 
more generally (Anh et al. 2010).  At one level, dealing 
with corruption requires a combination of local mobi-
lisation and the strong hand of central authority. 
However, in another interpretation, disciplining corrupt 
local officials is seen as a means by which the central 
state has continued to maintain its control over local 
cadres (Sikor et al. 2012: 4). At a micro-level, studies 
suggest that even low level political connections play a 
significant part in affecting land improvement through 
investment (Markussen & Tarp 2014).
Another grey zone between public and private interests 
is the changing role of state corporations, for example 
state forest companies (SFCs). In a study of SFCs, Phuc 
Xuan To et al show that what was once the face of the 
State for upland farmers, and had some legitimacy as 
a public corporation (bringing with it infrastructure 
and services, as well as making demands on land and 
resources), has become a corporate actor and is seen 
as a “new landlord”. This threatens the legitimacy not 
only of the SFCs themselves, as they are felt to have 
constraining and exploitative relations with local farmers 
and forest users, but also the public sphere that they 
continue to purport to represent (To et al. 2014).
Under the 2013 Land Law, land acquired for public 
purposes such as national defence or public infra-
structure, or land required for 100 per cent foreign direct 
investment, can be acquired by compulsory purchase. 
In principle, land required by domestic private investors 
for commercial purposes is to be acquired by voluntary 
conversion, through negotiation between the investor 
and landholder. In practice, compulsory acquisition has 
been applied in a number of cases of domestic private 
investment for commercial purposes. Public authorities 
play an important part in negotiating and sometimes 
coercing agreements even in nominally “voluntary” 
arrangements (World Bank 2011). The line between 
public interest and private benefit is thus somewhat 
blurred, particularly as state officials are often under-
stood to be serving the interests of investors vis-à-vis 
landholders (Han & Vu 2008).
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ACTOR DYNAMICS IN DECISION MAKING AND 
CONTESTATION AROUND LAND 
Land administration reform in Viet Nam has taken place 
is three stages which correspond with the enactment of 
key legislation. In 1979, the first cadastral survey was 
undertaken by the newly created General Department 
of Land Management (GDLM) and individual tenure 
within cooperatives was recognised for the first time. 
In 1994, GDLM merged with the National Department 
of Surveying and Mapping to create the General Depart-
ment of Land Administration (GDLA). Land departments 
were established at all administrative levels. At that time, 
 there was no overarching policy or long-term plan for 
land reform, and the State was still largely a centralised 
system. GDLA was responsible for allocating land and 
issuing land certificates, as per the 1993 Land Law. Those 
who knew the administration at that time describe it as 
powerful, impenetrable, and in possessing substantial 
resources. In 2002, the GDLA was incorporated into the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), 
a new body that drew together various departments and 
agencies. In addition to institutional restructuring of land 
administration, a full set of land policies were launched 
in 2002. The policies included 15-year programme and 
strategy for modernising land administration (Mellac et 
al. 2010).  
The incorporation of GDLA into MoNRE was widely seen 
as an effective means of reducing the power of the land 
administration. In the process, the department of land 
administration also lost control and influence over the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), 
which had played a crucial role in the previous stages of 
the land reform. Officers within MARD still complain of 
not having enough autonomy to draw up agriculture land 
use plans and having to deal with the powerful MoNRE. 
Another important institution involved in the first stages 
of land allocation was the Ministry of Forestry. When the 
Ministry of Forest was incorporated as a department 
within MARD in 1997, it became more distant from 
decisions concerning land. These changes were all 
consistent with the new priority given to industrialisation 
during the 9th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of Viet Nam (2001) and with the enactment of 
the third Land Law in 2003, which legally enabled 
the mobilisation of private investment in agriculture. 
This period marked the beginning of increasing land 
contestation by rural households dispossessed of their 
land.
The ten years in between the enactment of the third 
and fourth land laws are characterised by high levels 
of contestation. Provincial officers were officially 
encouraged to finance their development plans by 
renting land to investors, which resulted in the creation 
of many economic and industrial zones and opening 
up of spaces for construction. To attract investors, 
some provinces completely changed their city plan in 
favour of oversized zones and infrastructure (Mellac 
2014). Residential houses were expropriated with very 
low compensation rates paid (and sometimes no com-
pensation paid at all) to make way for luxury condos and 
other lucrative developments. In some cases, disputes 
erupted to such a level that the central level government 
(for instance the Prime Minister) was forced to intervene 
directly, sometimes at the expense of local officials. 
Accessing justice on land-related issues is usually 
dependent on the intervention of the executive power and 
its “invisible” hand, the Party. Together with increasing 
pressure from donors and foreign NGO, worsening 
land disputes has led to some adjustments from the 
government. These are reflected in the most recently 
enacted 2013 Land Law. The 2013 Land Law establishes 
a new (partially private) body at the provincial level which 
is in charge of defining land prices and approving land 
appropriations. It is too early to say whether this body, 
under the direction of the Chairman of the Provincial 
Peoples Committee, will play its role as independent 
decision maker and not fall subject to political 
interference. 
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAND 
RELATIONS 
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AGRICULTURAL MODERNISATION
In Viet Nam, the push for modernisation affects 
agriculture at two main levels. First, government at 
all levels has long sought to improve the efficiency 
and productivity of farming.  Second, the push for 
modernisation, industrialisation and accompanying 
urbanisation of the economy has resulted in substantial 
areas of land being taken out of agriculture altogether 
(Van Suu 2009; Le Duc Thinh 2009).
There has been a subtle shift in policy to improve 
productivity of farming away from a mainly land-based 
productivity concern, where land has long been the 
scarce resource in a labour-abundant country, toward 
a more recent interest in achieving better labour 
productivity in agriculture. This is in part due to the 
movement of young people in particular out of farming 
and toward higher paid and, in the eyes of government, 
more productive occupations. This policy shift gives 
an endorsement to farm consolidation, based on 
assumptions about economies of scale and the non-
viability of exceedingly small farms. It is reflected in 
the 2013 Land Law that increased ceilings on individual 
use of land, allowing micro-accumulation at village 
level by better off farmers and, by implication, micro-
dispossession of smaller farmers. However, as a study 
of farm fragmentation in northern Viet Nam points out, 
the economic return to consolidation may be marginal 
in the absence of significant opportunity costs for labour 
(Van Hung et al. 2007).
The push for modernisation through industrialisation 
and urbanisation of the economy is part of a policy shift 
that saw the revised 2003 Land Law make expropriation 
for national development purposes become easier 
(Wells-Dang 2013: 5). An important political-economic 
issue in such expropriation is the fuzzy line between 
expropriation for public benefit and expropriation for 
private interest. Since 2004, the procedure for land 
expropriation is in two steps, with the state as inter-
mediary. The first step is acquisition by the state with 
compensation, resettlement and associated support 
based on existing use. The second step is the allocation 
or leasing of the land to the developer and collection of 
the relevant land use fee or rental based on its new use. 
This on-leasing of land compensated at low agricultural 
rates by the State where developers then receive much 
higher real estate returns for the same land is a par-
ticular point of disaffection among those whose land has 
been expropriated.
As the gap in the value of land for agriculture and its 
value for industry and real estate has widened, so 
conversion has accelerated, particularly in peri-urban 
areas. Between 2001 and 2010, it is estimated that about 
ten per cent of Viet Nam’s agricultural land, or one 
million hectares, were converted to non-agricultural 
purposes. This raises concerns over food security 
as well as inequality, as relatively poor farmers see 
wealthy individuals, officials and companies benefiting 
from the land being resumed. It also accelerates social 
differentiation between poorer and better off groups 
(Dien et al. 2011). As a result, the issue has received 
widespread attention in the media and in government.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, LAND 
GRABBING AND DISPOSSESSION
There is relatively little foreign direct investment in land 
in Viet Nam, but indirectly foreign investment is behind 
some types of land dispossession. In particular, industrial 
investment drives the resumption of land for industrial 
estates near the big cities. There is also considerable 
foreign investment in the hotels sector in coastal areas, 
which has led to expropriation of land from farmers as 
well as loss of access to beach areas by fishers.
Nevertheless, land dispossession is a major source of 
disputes and grievances in Viet Nam, based largely on 
state acquisition of land for domestic investors. In the 
decade following the 2003 Land Law, about 70 per cent 
of 1.6 million complaints, petitions and denunciations 
officially recorded concerned land issues (Gillespie 
2015; Kerkvliet 2015). Many of these cases involved the 
dispossession of poor farmer near urban centres for the 
purposes of converting agricultural land to residences, 
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industry and infrastructure. The disputes that have 
become commonplace frequently end up stalling or 
delaying the conversion process. In the Mekong Delta, 
accumulation of land by wealthier farmers from 
poorer neighbours is leading to growing inequality. In 
mountainous areas, the main issues are around hydro-
power development, mining and acquisition of land for 
forestry and perennial crop plantations that involve  
state intervention in negotiations between land users 
and investors. There are other cases where conver-
sion works more smoothly and equitably, for example 
in the Van Quan development in Ha Tay where a more 
enlightened developer worked relatively openly and 
benignly with local government and affected farmers to 
negotiate agreeable compensation arrangements and 
where there have been incentives on all sides for the 
development (Bui 2009).
In contrast to the other CLMV countries, Viet Nam is 
remarkably free of large scale land grabs based on 
foreign direct investment for tree plantation projects. 
Domestic private investment in rubber in most north-
western mountainous provinces has, however, expanded 
dramatically. At the same time, smallholders have also 
been engaged in tree plantation projects over the past 
two decades. Sikor explains the smallholding pattern 
of fast growing tree production as relating to what he 
terms the “politics of possession” in Viet Nam, which in 
turn relates to ongoing state formation and the inclusion 
of rural subjects in state property projects. Various 
iterations of such projects, from the state enterprises as 
rural development nodes to the 1993 Land Law as a pre-
emptive response to potential erosion of state authority, 
reflect continuity through the transitions the country has 
undergone (Sikor 2012).
Rubber appears to be an exception to the small- 
holding pattern, with average plantation sizes of over 
500 hectares (Phuc & Nghi 2014: 17). Phuc and Nghi 
identify four different models, namely state companies, 
private companies (mostly in the Central Highlands), 
collaboration between state-owned companies and 
smallholders (mostly in north-western Viet Nam), and 
state-private partnerships (ibid: 22-32).
In ethnic minority areas, particularly in the Central 
Highlands, large swathes of land have been historically 
expropriated for state farms, dam construction, bauxite 
and other mining and for national defence purposes. The 
sensitivity of the Central Highlands has made grievances 
more difficult to express and publicise than those of 
lowland Kinh people in peri-urban areas, but the media, 
NGOs and others have taken such grievances to higher 
levels (Wells-Dang 2013:10). The severe unrest of the 
early 2000s was closely linked to land dispossession 
issues.
FORMALISATION, TITLING AND TENURE 
SECURITY
The red book system of issuing land use rights certi-
ficates since 1993 has differed from other countries 
in the region. The process in Viet Nam has been 
domestically driven and has not been supported by 
development assistance programs such as the World 
Bank-supported land titling programs in Thailand, 
Laos and Cambodia. The conditions and processes 
of formalisation in Viet Nam are home-grown, and 
have responded to the largely smallholder pattern of 
agriculture. The issuing of red books also reflects the 
constitutional ownership of land “by the people” as a 
whole and its management by the State. The program 
achieved a rapid coverage of about 90 per cent of 
all households within less than ten years of its first 
operation (Do & Iyer 2008: 546). There has been donor 
involvement in land administration, notably through 
the SIDA-funded Strengthening the Environmental 
Management and Land Administration (SEMLA) project 
2006-2010. However, this was largely technical in 
scope and oriented at improving the efficiency and 
performance of land administration, as well as linking 
it to environmental considerations in land use planning, 
rather than driving the land formalisation process as a 
whole.
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Formalisation has experienced problems with the 
relatively short periods of allocation for land used for 
annual crops. The 20 year allocation established in 1993 
expired in 2013, and the new Land Law has extended the 
period of allocation to 50 years. The allocation term for 
land used for perennial crops has been kept at 50 
years. With an active land market in most parts of Viet 
Nam, the allocation period has, on the one hand, meant 
that farmers have a degree of security and control over 
land.  On the other hand, it has led to rapid social differ-
entiation in more commercialised areas as poorer 
families have often made distress sales (Gorman 2010).
There is concern over land use rights certificates and 
the relatively low percentage of red books that are 
registered either in the sole name of women or in the 
joint names of men and women. Compared to Laos, for 
example, where a majority of titles are registered either 
in women’s or joint ownership, fewer than half of red 
books are registered in the name of a female household 
member (Scott 2003; Sang et al. 2013; Bonnin & Turner 
2013).
LAND CONCENTRATION, LANDLESSNESS 
AND DISTRIBUTION
Land shortage is a longstanding issue in Viet Nam, 
and it has deep historical roots. The very low per capita 
availability of land has resulted in land shortages and 
 landlessness, with the average farm size being well 
under half a hectare. Of even greater concern is the 
social distribution of land and the forces for land 
concentration (Wells-Dang 2013). Landlessness and 
associated land struggles have a history in Viet Nam 
that is closely connected with the country’s political 
transitions. Land justice in the anticolonial and 
revolutionary movements has long associated land with 
Party legitimacy. As a result, landlessness and the more 
general concentration of land in contemporary Viet Nam, 
is a highly volatile and sensitive issue.
Inequality in access to land takes different forms in 
different parts of the country. In peri-urban zones, 
expropriation for industrial estates, housing and infra-
structure has resulted in land loss by smallholders. In 
the Mekong Delta, the re-emergence of landlessness 
as a result of distress sales associated with debt is a 
reversion to longstanding inequality in landholding in 
this part of the country that was temporarily ameliorated 
following de-collectivisation and the allocation of land 
based on household size. In the Red River Delta, it is 
closely connected with processes of land conversion 
linked to modernisation and industrialisation policies 
(Nguyen 2004). In the Central Highlands, ethnic minor-
ities have lost land over the past several decades. This is 
partly due to state enterprises encroaching on fallows 
 previously used for shifting cultivation, land encroach-
ment by Kinh settlers in and near New Economic 
Zones, and land sales as certificates facilitated the 
buying and selling of land. These displacements also 
contribute to further encroachment on forest lands 
by shifting cultivation as poor families are displaced 
by those encroaching on, or otherwise acquiring, land 
to grow coffee (Meyfroidt et al. 2013). More recently, 
dams on the upper Se San, Srepok and Sekong Rivers 
have flooded large areas of fertile valley land, requiring 
resettlement. This is particularly significant given 
the much higher rates of rural poverty among ethnic 
minorities, and the lack of livelihood alternatives for 
those who lose access to land.
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LAND AND RELATED POLICY AND LAW 
REFORM
There have been four land laws in Viet Nam, passed 
in 1987, 1993, 2003 and 2013 respectively. The most 
recent revision of the Land Law was passed in 2013, 
which means that whatever advocacy and policy reform 
is carried out for the immediate future will need to 
work within the framework of that law. There was an 
extensive process of consultation over this law, which 
represents an opening of legal and policy drafting 
processes in Viet Nam relative to earlier land legislation 
(Wells-Dang 2013: 11-12). Several key areas of reform 
lay behind the most recent version. The World Bank 
sums these up in a policy advice document to the Viet 
Namese government as: enhancing agricultural land 
effectiveness by prolonging the term of land allocation 
and raising the land ceiling; creating more equitable and 
transparent land acquisition processes to address the 
multitude of accumulating grievances over expropriation; 
strengthening the land use rights of vulnerable groups 
including ethnic minorities, women and the rural poor; 
and improving accountability and transparency in 
planning and governance processes (Pham et al. 2012).
POSITIONS, AGENDAS AND INTERESTS 
BEHIND LAND GOVERNANCE REFORM
Advocacy coalitions are being supported on a range of 
issues in Viet Nam, perhaps none more pressing or more 
complex than that concerned with access to land (Wells-
Dang 2013: 4). There are still very limited successes in 
engaging the private sector. 
Advocacy coalitions have taken advantage of new civil 
society spaces to work closely with progressive govern-
ment, academic and other actors, for example through 
LandNet, to press for forestland use rights and other 
issues related to livelihoods associated with land access 
(LandNet 2014). Foreign NGOs have been instrumental in 
the establishment of these coalitions.
Consultation on legal reform is a recent innovation, and 
there was quite widespread discussion ahead of the 2013 
Land Law (Oxfam 2013). Questions remain, however, on 
the depth and openness of such consultation processes.
Resistance to land conversion and negotiation over 
compensation have become ubiquitous in Viet Nam. 
There is limited political space for organising and 
confronting authority directly, so innovative and effective 
means of resisting the more blatant abuses and dis-
possessions have to be developed. They include the use 
of cultural and political nuance to draw on particular 
ideological tropes (Labbé 2011; Labbe & Musil 2013).
GOVERNMENT 
Together with Chinese territorial problems and public 
enterprise management, land is one of the most 
prominent and conflictual questions facing those in 
power. Land issues face authorities at every level, from 
local arenas to the core of the Party and the State. Over 
the past decade, various scandals and judicial affairs 
concerning land involving government officers have been 
widely discussed at a societal level and have posed a 
threat to the power equilibrium. This was the case, for 
example, in 2010 when a controversial bauxite mine 
project in the Central Highlands put the Prime Minister 
under pressure when he was accused of favouring 
Chinese interests and selling off Viet Namese interests 
in environment and land. This affair, along with other 
scandals, nearly cost the Prime Minister his position 
during the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of 
Viet Nam in January 2011. One year later, the same 
Prime Minister was accused of favouring his daughter 
in the eco-park affair in Van Giang and was forced to 
rapidly intervene in the Doan Van Vuon affair in order 
to demonstrate Hanoi’s concern about land abuses by 
local authorities. This was insufficient to allay popular 
dissatisfaction, despite local officers being sentenced. 
Prison sentences were considered too lenient and 
missed higher officials involved in the case. There was 
also public anger at a sentence reduction for the Vuon 
family. 
CONSTRAINTS AND OPENINGS IN LAND 
GOVERNANCE
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Internal dissension was particularly visible during 2013, 
when the new Land Law was under discussion at the 
National Assembly. The law was the first not to pass 
the National Assembly after its first reading. Officially 
this was because some amendments were no longer 
consistent with the Constitution, which meant it had 
to wait for promulgation of the new one. It is, however, 
hard for many to believe that such a problem was not 
anticipated. The delay, which was used to organise 
an internal consultation (six million comments were 
counted on the National Assembly website), was the 
occasion for many officials, NGOs and donors, to express 
their concern for the country’s future. Technically, the 
discussions concerned issues such as the procedures 
and scope of land recovery by the State, land categories 
(agricultural and non-agricultural land) and the amount 
of land allocated to State Forest Enterprises. Behind 
these technical points, however, a more detailed analysis 
shows that officials within the government were divided 
over the role to give the State in land management 
(Mellac et al. 2010). On the one hand, some officers 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
considered that State intervention and maintaining the 
protected agricultural land category were still necessary 
to sustain small farm production during transition. On 
the other, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environ-
ment (MoNRE) officers or ex-officers, such as Dang 
Hung Vo, had a much more progressive discourse that 
emphasised technical aspects of management and 
gave titles and individual tenure (not to say property) in 
a free and transparent market a key role in developing 
the country. In 2013, the discussions ended up with few 
changes in the approved law compared with the initial 
version, revealing the domination of the conservative 
(and non-liberal) wing of the Party and its will to keep 
State control over land.
PRIVATE SECTOR
The conservative position on property rights in relation 
to the 2013 Land Law was of concern to the private 
sector, which was hoping for easier access to land and 
property. Under the law, private developers obtain better 
facilities to transfer project land to other investors, and 
foreigner investors are allowed to access land by land 
allocation in the same way as domestic companies. But 
all have to face what professionals called “new harsh 
requirements” (Nguyen Quoc 2014) to lease and obtain 
land allocation by the State.
In 2015, foreigners benefited from the 40th anniversary 
of the final US retreat from South Viet Nam (in the 
context of tensions with China and Viet Nam’s rappro-
chement with the US) and the boom of the Southeast 
Asia property market, with a partial opening up of 
ownership. The newly amended Housing Law allows 
overseas nationals to buy up to 30 per cent of a condo-
minium or up to 250 houses in a ward for a maximum of 
50 years and to enjoy the same rights to lease, transfer 
or sell the property as Viet Namese citizens. These new 
dispositions were positively received by the private sector. 
But the weight of the State is still considered as a serious 
disincentive to investment in land and housing. 
Along with the main donors and NGOs, the private sector, 
notably represented by the Viet Nam Business Forum (an 
NGO formed by different national and foreign chambers 
of commerce and business associations) has been invited 
to join discussions organised under ministerial supervision 
in order to prepare new legislation such as the Land Law 
(2013) and the Housing Law (2015).
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DONORS
In their lobbying for further liberalisation and less 
State intervention in the land market, private guilds 
and investors have been strongly supported by some 
of the donors, notably the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Their stated arguments and 
aims are nevertheless slightly different to those of the 
investors. The World Bank and ADB both recognise 
that land allocation and red book distribution are one 
of the main achievements of the State since Doi Moi 
(World Bank 2002). However, they also assess that the 
State is still too corrupt and too interventionist, and 
that its intervention creates market distortions that 
disadvantage the poor. A study by the ADB suggests that 
increased efficiency, greater transparency and reduced 
costs in the formal land market may benefit the poor 
more than traditional “protective” interventions aimed 
at restricting market transactions (Asian Development 
Bank 2004).
Market opening (as a synonym of economic develop-
ment) and poverty reduction are the two main motifs 
of donors when intervening on land. As they are 
relatively neutral and difficult to contradict, they are 
used to legitimise intervention, making them effective 
in a context where land has long been considered by 
the State as an internal and strategic domain which 
is impossible to study, comment or intervene. Donors 
were traditionally kept at a distance from land matters, 
and cooperation, when approved, was mainly restricted 
to technical aspects of land management. This was the 
case for the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) in the early 1990s and later on for the Swedish 
International Development Agency (and its successive 
CPLAR and SEMLA programs), which both benefited 
from being historical partners of Viet Nam (Mellac and 
al. 2010). 
During the same period (1994-1997), the World Bank 
approached the General Department of Land Admin-
istration at different times to offer its help in land 
management modernisation, but the government 
rejected its offer and preferred to use its own budget 
to fund projects (Dang Hung Vo & Palmkvist 2001). The 
approval of the first land project funded by the World 
Bank, the Land Administration Project, in 2008, was a 
symbolic but important shift in land management. It 
reflected rapprochement with the US and progressive 
adoption of the main principles of a liberal economy 
(Mellac and al. 2010). Land choices are now publicly 
discussed and donors are able to express their views 
on subjects as crucial as land, the content of the 
Constitution, and the role of the Party (as was the 
case in December 2013 after the new Land Law and 
Constitution were passed). Land has thus been at the 
core of donor engagement in wider political-economic 
affairs that was previously off-limits to outsiders.
CIVIL SOCIETY
Media discussion on issues previously deemed too 
sensitive to air in public has increased significantly in 
recent years. Civil society coalitions have also emerged. 
However, it would be wrong to overstate the level of 
freedom of expression in Viet Nam on sensitive issues, 
among which land ranks very high. 
In contrast with Cambodia, civil society in Viet Nam is 
still in its very early formative stage and land is still one 
of the more critical and dangerous subjects to intervene. 
In 2013, the rejection of the Land Law by the National 
Assembly served as an occasion for NGOs to express 
their opinion on land and to organise themselves to 
influence State decisions. Such expression has been 
facilitated by the diversification of the media. Nhân Dân, 
for instance, has an internet publication in English, and 
more recently in French, that are at much greater liberty 
than the Viet Namese official print. Public discussion 
on land and other issues was also enhanced by the 
Government decision in 2012 to organise popular consult- 
ation on legislation and other government actions. This 
relative space of freedom was appreciated and has 
actively been occupied by big foreign NGOs such as Oxfam.
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The embryonic civil society land network was reinforced 
by the creation of new organisations such as the Forest 
Peoples Land Rights Network (LandNet) officially formed 
in April 2013. Yet, there are discordant voices within civil 
society itself as some local NGOs are uncomfortable 
with the methodology and philosophy of foreign ones. 
This is the case with LandNet, which was created to 
differentiate local NGO initiatives from those of Oxfam, 
which was in charge of implementing the Advocacy 
Coalition Support Programme funded by the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID). LandNet created a very active Land Alliance 
later known as Landa. The main criticism from Landa 
concerned the role given to State agents within the 
advocacy coalitions and what they saw as Oxfam’s overly 
conciliatory approach which involved overlooking State 
violation of laws and discretionary use of power in order 
to foster dialogue on land issues. For their part, Oxfam 
and its partners emphasised the efficiency of multi-
stakeholder initiatives and the necessity to transcend 
the standard state-society dichotomy, bringing together 
activists and officials, non-state and state actors, to 
have a chance to influence discussion and decisions on 
complex issues around land (Wells-Dang and Pham, 
2014). The same partners considered that their report 
and the pressure they exercised were crucial to the 
National Assembly decision to postpone voting on the 
Land Law by five months (ibid). Both local and inter-
national NGOs advocate for less State and more secure 
individual land use rights in a more democratic and 
liberal political regime giving little place to either 
customary land regimes or collective intervention in 
resource redistribution. As such, the conservative 
response of the government can be understood as a 
remaining manifestation of socialist ideology opposed  
to the broad context of liberalism.
The tradition of Party control and its fear of losing power 
explain the tardy emergence of civil society and the 
strong State resistance to broader policy opening and 
freedom. This is evident in the way major land conflicts 
have been managed and resolved since enactment of 
the Land Law in 2003. On the one hand, Hanoi has been 
more and more concerned with attenuating the poor 
reputation that comes from local corruption and abuses 
associated with land, by regularly sacrificing some local 
leaders. On the other hand, land activists, irrespective of 
their direct connection with land problems (such as 
inhabitants or lawyers) have faced sharp political repri-
mand such as violent repression of demonstrations and/
or prison sentences largely disproportionate to their 
actions. 
RESEARCH INSTITUTES
Land questions were for a long time in Viet Nam 
impossible to study and discuss in public. This has 
created a big gap in historical data, for example 
on the 1950s land reform or more recently on de-
collectivisation. The situation is less critical now, but 
data is still missing or very difficult to gather and verify. 
Some Viet Namese research institutes are now strongly 
invested in research on land, for example, IPSARD 
(Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development) and some forest institutions. But it is still 
difficult to criticise State actions, and the more critical 
academic work comes from outside Viet Nam, such as 
Forest Trends or Viet Namese students conducting their 
theses abroad. An important question is whether this 
will progressively increase the critical edge of local 
research.
One question that is crucial in all the countries of the 
region is the difficult distinction between research, 
advocacy and political position. This question arises in 
part because of the declining practical and financial 
separation between the different domains: Viet Namese 
(but also foreign) students being paid and working for 
foreign NGOs; NGO members positioning themselves 
as researchers; and of the inherently political nature of 
research on an issue that for so long has been kept out 
of the public domain as pressures continued to mount.
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Land has always been an important issue shaping 
relations between central and local authority, between 
state and society, and between the rural poor and 
stronger economic and political players in Viet Nam. 
Land has been embroiled in the social and political 
upheavals of the country, and it continues to be a highly 
charged issue in the country’s development. With Viet 
Nam’s industrialisation and urbanisation, land issues 
go well beyond agriculture and food production. One of 
the key dilemmas facing Viet Nam is the maintenance 
of fertile agricultural land to underpin the country’s food 
security versus the conversion of such land to other 
uses demanded by the rapid economic development of 
the country. The way in which this dilemma is resolved 
will affect different groups in quite different ways. The 
continuing politically charged issues around land are 
heightened by small openings for public discussion, 
research and progressive reform, but there are also 
many forces that continue to militate against progressive 
land policy reform. Pressures for reform come from 
different directions: some more oriented to a rapidly 
growing domestic private sector and international 
business that would like to see a freeing up of the land 
market, and some more out of concern for the social 
marginalisation produced by state appropriation of 
land. Donors and foreign civil society organisations 
have found increasing spaces in which to operate, but 
land questions in Viet Nam will ultimately be addressed 
mainly by domestic players. Such players involve sig-
nificant private sector and civil society voices as well as 
the still dominant State. 
CONCLUSION
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